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1 Introduction 
In the early 2000s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was widely considered to be in 
terminal decline (Dieter 2006). The demand for its loan programs at a record low, the IMF 
reduced the size of its staff and focused on its “surveillance” activities (Reinhart and Trebesch 
2015). The 2008 global financial crisis and the ensuing sovereign debt crises, however, re-
established the crucial role that the IMF plays for the global economy. With the IMF’s financial 
commitments reaching new all-time highs in 2010, pressing questions about the role and 
effectiveness of the “most powerful international institution in history” (Stone 2002, 1) re-
emerge.1 
We take this resurgence of the IMF’s lending activities as a motivation to re-evaluate how 
successful the IMF is in achieving one of its core mandates, namely to help countries overcome 
balance-of-payments problems. As these problems usually manifest themselves in both the 
government and private companies facing severe limitations in access to foreign capital, we 
focus on restoring market and investor confidence as a key outcome to evaluate the IMF’s 
success. We consider this an urgent task for economists not only because of the IMF’s 
widespread engagement (see Figure 1) but also because the IMF’s effectiveness in this regard 
has recently been questioned in policy circles. Out of fear of a “stigma” associated with the use 
of Fund resources triggering adverse market reactions, countries are often hesitant to enter 
IMF programs and question their benefits (Andone and Scheubel 2017; IMF 2017). Probably 
not least due to the alleged decline of the IMF – but also because of the empirical challenges 
associated with assessing its effectiveness – economists so far have no clear answer to this. 
We begin our analysis of this question by illustrating the problem of endogenous selection into 
IMF programs. To measure market confidence in a country’s creditworthiness, we use a large 
monthly panel data set of sovereign credit ratings from different US and Non-US agencies as 
well as assessments from professional investors. Combined with start dates of IMF programs, 
these data unambiguously indicate that countries typically sign IMF agreements while their 
creditworthiness is in severe decline. The fact that countries tend to experience economic crises 
and negative trends in their main economic fundamentals when IMF programs begin, results 
in a substantial negative selection effect that biases downwards any estimates of the IMF’s 
effect on creditworthiness (and related measures) that do not adequately account for this. 
                                                                                             
1 Arguably, the World Bank is of comparable importance, but with a different policy focus. For related research 
on the World Bank see Kersting and Kilby (2018). 
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Figure 1 – IMF Lending, 1973-2013 
 
Note: Number in parentheses indicates share of years with an active IMF program in the 1973-2013 period. 
Source: Dreher (2006, updated) 
 
We apply several empirical approaches to circumvent this endogeneity problem. Our main 
identification strategy is based on an instrumental variable (IV) that combines temporal 
variation in the IMF’s liquidity with cross-sectional variation in a country’s prior probability 
of participating in an IMF program (see also Lang 2016). The IMF’s liquidity varies primarily 
because of an institutional rule that requires the IMF to review the financial contributions of 
its members (“quotas”) every five years and as a consequence of large individual loan 
repayments. For identification, we exploit the fact that the IMF tends to expand its regular 
clientele in years in which its liquidity is higher, so that countries with an initially lower 
participation probability are more likely to receive a program in these years. The identifying 
assumption underlying this approach, which we explain in more detail in section 3, thus 
follows a difference-in-differences logic. 
Using annualized panel data for a maximum of 100 countries over the 1987-2013 period, we 
find that the simple correlation of IMF programs with sovereign ratings is strongly negative. 
As one would expect in the presence of a downward bias, the OLS coefficient, while remaining 
negative, moves increasingly close to zero when conditioning step-by-step on country and 
year fixed effects as well as lagged macroeconomic and political controls. We then show that 
the remaining negative, statistically significant relationship turns positive and statistically 
insignificant when switching to the IV approach. This pattern emerges irrespective of whether 
we focus on ratings issued by Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s or Fitch, from non-US rating 
agencies based in Europe and Asia or when employing assessments by Institutional Investors, 
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which are based on surveys among professional investors and analysts at banks, money 
management and securities companies. 
When turning to the mechanisms, we find that the absence of a significant aggregate effect 
masks important underlying dynamics. Our evidence suggests that the economic adjustments 
under IMF programs substantially reduce economic growth in the short run. Given that both 
official rating agency methods and empirical evidence show that ratings are directly 
(positively) influenced by GDP and growth, these contractionary effects would usually result 
in lower credit ratings. The fact that they are not affected suggests that IMF programs have a 
positive signaling effect. This signal (“seal of approval”) creates positive expectations about the 
country’s future policy path and cushions the drop in creditworthiness that countries 
undergoing such contractionary adjustments would usually suffer from. 
We corroborate this result in three ways: First, specifications that ignore “bad control” 
problems reveal that when controlling for GDP dynamics, the conditional effect of IMF 
programs becomes substantially positive and statistically significant. IMF-induced GDP 
contractions, in contrast, do not seem to significantly affect credit ratings. Second, we use the 
credit ratings at a monthly frequency and information on the exact date of IMF agreements, 
and isolate variation within individual country-year observations with the help of country-
times-year fixed effects. Event-based specifications then show that rating dynamics deteriorate 
before IMF agreements, but begin to improve in the month after the programs start. We argue 
that these immediate improvements cannot plausibly be attributed to the success of economic 
adjustments and political reforms but only to a positive signaling effect. Third, we conduct a 
systematic text analysis of statements about the IMF’s influence on sovereign credit ratings 
available on the news database Dow Jones Factiva. Out of 117 statements from rating agencies 
that mention the IMF, 84 indicate a positive influence of an active IMF program on their 
assessment while only one mentions a negative influence. A majority of these statements refer 
to the anticipated positive effects of policy reforms, implemented as part of the programs, on 
investor confidence. 
In the remainder of this paper, we first examine theoretical expectations regarding potential 
mechanisms based on the existing literature in section 2. Section 3 presents our identification 




2 Potential Channels and Existing Literature 
To increase creditworthiness, IMF programs need to increase investors’ confidence in the 
”ability and willingness of an issuer […] to meet its financial obligations in full and on time” 
(Standard and Poor’s 2016; see also Panizza et al. 2009; Tomz and Wright 2007). We argue that 
it is helpful to differentiate between two main channels. First, we define adjustment effects as 
effects on ratings that are consequences of short-term changes in the country’s economic and 
political fundamentals under IMF programs. Second, we consider signaling effects as changes 
in ratings caused by the signals about the country’s expected future policy path that the 
presence of an IMF program sends to credit rating agencies and investors. As we build on this 
conceptual separation when empirically analyzing the channels driving the effects we find, 
we discuss theoretical considerations and existing evidence on both channels in the following. 
2.1 Adjustment Effects 
Consider adjustment effects first. A sovereign’s creditworthiness as measured by credit ratings 
is most strongly influenced by the country’s economic and political fundamentals. In the 
empirical literature on the determinants of ratings, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, 
GDP growth, inflation, and external debt are found to be robust predictors (Afonso 2003; 
Cantor and Packer 1996; Fuchs and Gehring 2017; Hill, Brooks, and Faff 2010). Several political 
indicators like the political regime type, partisanship, and the rule of law have also been found 
to correlate with rating outcomes (Archer, Biglaiser, and DeRouen 2007). Together, these 
variables explain a large share of the variance in sovereign ratings. These results in the 
scholarly literature are in line with official rating manuals, which agencies publish to comply 
with regulatory standards. 
The previous literature on the IMF examines several of these key determinants of 
creditworthiness as the outcomes of IMF programs (for reviews of this literature see Dreher 
and Lang 2016; Steinwand and Stone 2008). To the extent that IMF programs affect such 
outcomes, they influence creditworthiness via the adjustment channel. In terms of economic 
fundamentals, the focus of many such studies has been on economic growth. While some 
studies find a positive (Bas and Stone 2014) or insignificant (Atoyan and Conway 2006) 
relationship between IMF programs and growth, the majority of empirical studies suggest 
negative immediate effects (Barro and Lee 2005; Dreher 2006; Easterly 2005; Marchesi and 
Sirtori 2011; Przeworkski and Vreeland 2000). Beyond growth, monetary stability, debt 
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management and the containment of external arrears are key goals of IMF programs 
(Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King 2016). IMF programs are associated to reduced inflation and 
monetary growth, less risk of currency crises and banking crises, and improved market 
performance of banks (Dreher and Walter 2010; Papi, Presbitero, and Zazzaro 2015; Steinwand 
and Stone 2008). 
In addition to these economic effects, IMF programs also appear to affect political outcomes. 
Several scholars link IMF programs to political instability and suggest that they increase the 
risk of civil war onset (Hartzell et al. 2010), coup d’états (Casper 2017), and government crises 
(Dreher and Gassebner 2012). One explanation for these politically destabilizing effects of IMF 
programs is that the burdens of economic adjustments under IMF programs are often 
distributed unequally (Lang 2016; Vreeland 2002). 
In sum, the existing evidence suggests some positive adjustment effects regarding financial 
and monetary indicators, but mostly negative adjustments regarding reduced growth and 
political instability. It is thus an open empirical question as to whether the immediate 
implementation of adjustment policies resulting from IMF interventions leads to 
improvements or deteriorations in creditworthiness. Before we turn to testing this empirically, 
we distinguish these adjustment effects from signaling effects. 
2.2 Signaling Effects 
Sovereign credit ratings, as assessments of a future default probability, are based not only on 
information about a country’s current economic and political performance, but also on 
expectations of the country’s future development (Fuchs and Gehring 2017). As economic 
indicators like GDP and inflation are imperfect and noisy measures, it is rational for investors 
and rating agencies to use other signals to infer information and adapt their assessment. Any 
signal that gives an indication about the country’s future policy path will influence this 
expectation. IMF programs can plausibly serve as such a signal. 
On the one hand, they could function as a “seal of approval” (Polak 1991). The Fund itself 
claims that “IMF resources provide a cushion that eases the adjustment policies and reforms 
that a country must make to correct its balance of payments problem” (IMF 2016a, emphasis 
added). Accordingly, the provided liquidity is intended to enable a period of IMF-approved 
adjustments. In addition, the Fund can “lend credibility” (Stone 2002) to the announced 
reforms, and function as a commitment device to overcome time consistency problems (Dreher 
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2009).2 To the extent that the IMF agrees to arrangements only if it approves of the country’s 
policy agenda, its engagement also indicates reform quality (Dreher 2009; Marchesi and 
Thomas 1999). For these reasons, the Fund’s engagement can positively affect expectations 
about the reforms’ effects on sustainability and macroeconomic performance (Edwards 2006; 
Mody and Saravia 2006; Corsetti et al. 2006; Morris and Shin 2006). 3  
On the other hand, IMF programs may convey negative information (Andone and Scheubel 
2017; Bas and Stone 2014; Ito 2012). If IMF programs are perceived as indicating that the 
country’s financial problems are more severe than official indicators suggest, they can act as a 
negative signal. The IMF (2014) itself, for instance, is worried that countries under its loan 
programs carry a “stigma” (see also Reinhart and Trebesch 2015). Our background research 
and interviews at the IMF’s headquarters with IMF staff revealed that in the recent past several 
countries indeed hesitated to sign Fund agreements out of fear of such a stigma.4 In a recent 
statement on lending reforms the IMF (2017) states: “[a] key objective of the lending reform is 
to reduce the perceived stigma of borrowing from the IMF.” 
2.3 Issues with the Existing Evidence 
Existing empirical studies linking IMF programs with creditworthiness have produced 
inconsistent results. We argue that issues with the proxies used as outcome variables and with 
accounting for selection bias are likely to be behind this inconsistency.5  
A first set of studies examines the IMF’s effect on inflow of different kinds of capital, mostly 
foreign direct investment (FDI). In an early review, Bird and Rowlands (2002) conclude that 
the empirical literature suggests that IMF programs reduce countries’ access to capital markets. 
In the following, some studies found a negative effect (Bird and Rowlands 2009; Edwards 2006; 
Jensen 2004), insignificant results (Rowlands 2001) or evidence for a (conditionally) positive 
effect on FDI inflows (Bauer, Cruz, and Graham 2012; Biglaiser and DeRouen 2010; Woo 2013). 
                                                                                             
2 This conjecture is in line the literature on the effects of membership in international organizations more broadly 
(Dreher and Lang 2016). Membership in international organizations can improve borrowing conditions and 
increase inflows of foreign capital (Dreher, Mikosch, and Voigt 2015; Dreher and Voigt 2011; Gray 2009; 2013). 
3 An additional signaling effect of IMF programs discussed in the literature is the creditor moral hazard problem. 
The IMF could lead creditors to increase investments in government bonds of program countries because they 
anticipate IMF bailouts. Dreher’s (2004, 20) literature survey concludes that there is “considerable evidence in favor 
of the hypothesis that the safety net provided by the IMF creates significant moral hazard with investors.” We are 
not separately examining this aspect, as we are only interested in whether the IMF helps countries to restore 
creditworthiness, one way or the other. 
4 Multiple conversations with several IMF employees in the period between November 2016 and November 2017. 
5 Steinwand and Stone (2008) and Bauer et al. (2012) reach the same conclusion in their literature reviews. We refer 
the reader to these studies for a more detailed overview of this literature. 
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Jorra (2012) uses an indicator for sovereign default and finds an increased probability of 
default as a consequence of IMF lending. Another set of studies examines the IMF’s effect on 
government bond spreads. Among these, Mody and Saravia (2006) and Eichengreen, Kletzer, 
and Mody (2006) find lower bond spreads in IMF program countries.6 Chapman et al. (2015) 
report that implementing an IMF program is associated with higher bond spreads, but find 
that the size of the IMF loan, the extent of conditionality, and the political proximity of the 
program country to the United States all lead to important heterogeneities.  
We argue that all of these measures come with important problems that can be avoided when 
using sovereign credit ratings as a proxy for creditworthiness. Compared to FDI, ratings are a 
more direct and precise proxy for creditworthiness. FDI flows are an indirect consequence of 
creditworthiness but are influenced by many other factors like economic openness and, in 
addition, capture only a fraction of total capital inflows. Compared to using defaults, which 
are very rare events, as a proxy, ratings provide a more fine-grained assessment and go 
beyond capturing only the extreme end of the wide spectrum of balance of payment problems. 
Compared to bond spreads, credit ratings are available for a larger set of countries and remain 
a reliable measure in times of crisis. Ratings provide a continuous measure of creditworthiness 
that, unlike bond spreads, is not directly influenced by changes in general market conditions 
such as shifts in demand for different asset classes (e.g., fixed income vs. equity) and risk 
categories (e.g., flight into quality), and bond supply effects. If governments under IMF 
programs adjust the supply of government bonds or when central banks acquire them, bond 
spreads convey a biased and inaccurate picture of how investors perceive the creditworthiness 
of a country. In addition, the liquidity of trading, which is crucial for the informational value 
of the market price, is often low for countries in crises. In sum, bond spreads are the least 
informative at the time when we are most interested in the information they convey. Ratings, 
on the other hand, are at all times easily comparable across countries and over time as they 
proxy for the same latent variable in each case. To the best of our knowledge, in this literature 
only Cho (2014) uses a measure that is related to credit ratings, and finds that assessments by 
Institutional Investor correlate positively with IMF programs in countries with left-wing 
governments.  
                                                                                             
6 A different but related series of studies has looked at how government bond spreads react to IMF signals regarding 
the likelihood of future bailouts (see footnote 2). Some studies find evidence for such “creditor moral hazard” 
caused by the IMF (Dell’Ariccia, Schnabel, and Zettelmeyer 2006; Lee and Shin 2008). Other studies provide 
evidence against the argument (e.g., Noy 2008). 
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The second shortcoming in the literature summarized above is that most studies do not 
establish causality in a convincing way. As selection into IMF programs is clearly not random, 
endogeneity severely biases the estimates of analyses that do not account for this. Mody and 
Saravia (2006, 852), the most cited study in this field, state that due to the difficulty of modeling 
selection into IMF programs and finding a suitable instrument, “explicit consideration of the 
selection bias problem is not undertaken.” While Jorra (2012) uses an instrument, its 
underlying assumption that IMF programs are the only plausible channel that link a country’s 
political proximity to the United States and default events is unlikely to hold: A country’s 
economic condition is plausibly related to the political preferences of the country’s 
government via more direct channels.7 Chapman et al. (2015) provide instruments for the 
extent of IMF conditionality and IMF loan size, but do not instrument the presence of an IMF 
program. 
Most other studies in this literature address endogeneity by controlling for a range of 
observable factors. As we explain in more detail in the next section, this is unlikely to remove 
the entire bias and, in addition, often creates a bad control problem. In sum, the astonishing 
differences in empirical results are potentially also attributable to the lack of plausible 
identification strategies. The empirical approach we present in the following aims to augment 
the literature in these respects. 
3 Data and Identification 
3.1 Dependent Variable: Sovereign Credit Ratings 
Our main proxy to measure the creditworthiness of a country is its sovereign’s long-term 
foreign-currency rating. In addition to their aforementioned advantages over other measures 
used in the previous literature, sovereign ratings possess several additional features that make 
them good proxies for sovereign creditworthiness: First, Reinhart (2002) shows that ratings 
predict defaults. This makes them an informative measure of creditworthiness for countries 
with severe payment problems, an important feature for our research question. Second, 
previous studies have related ratings to changes in government bond spreads (Afonso, 
Furceri, and Gomes 2012). They thus indicate the terms at which a country can access 
                                                                                             
7 See Lang 2016 for a detailed evaluation of different empirical strategies that have been used in the literature on 
the IMF’s effects and the need for a new instrument. When we use political proximity to the United States as an IV 
in our sample we do not find the IV to be relevant enough in the first stage. 
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international capital markets. Third, many investors, in particular pension funds but also 
insurances and to some degree banks, are bound by internal regulations that restrict 
investments to investment-grade bonds. In addition to the information effect that bond 
assessments convey to investors, this “hard-wiring” is another reason why rating changes 
directly affect refinancing costs of governments. Fourth, ratings serve as a de-facto ceiling for 
the credit rating of private companies from the respective country (Borensztein, Cowan, and 
Valenzuela 2013), and hence also capture the private sector’s ease of access to foreign       
capital. 
The main criteria applied to assess sovereign bonds are to a large degree comparable across 
agencies, but there are some differences (Fuchs and Gehring 2017). While our main estimations 
rely on ratings from Standard and Poor’s (S&P), which offers the broadest country coverage 
over the longest period, we also use ratings from Moody’s and Fitch to show that the existing 
differences across agencies do no drive the results.8 Since the three major rating agencies are 
based in the US, and cultural distance between an agency and the sovereign it assesses can 
influence ratings (Fuchs and Gehring 2017), we also consider ratings from agencies based 
elsewhere: The variable Ratings(Non-US) captures the average of all major agencies outside 
the United States.9 This included the Japanese agencies Japan Credit Rating (JCR) and Rating 
and Investment Information (R&I), as well as the German agency Feri, the Canadian Dominion 
Bond Rating Services (DBRS) and Capital Intelligence (CI) from Cyprus. 
We use hand-collected information on sovereign ratings by most agencies from Bloomberg 
(see Appendix A, as well as Fuchs and Gehring, 2017 for details). Ratings published by Feri 
and Fitch are directly from the agencies. To analyze the dynamics around IMF program starts 
we use data at a monthly frequency. Our panel regressions at the yearly level use ratings at 
the end of the year. All ratings are translated to a 21-point scale, assigning the highest value 
for a “AAA” rating, while “C” and below translates into a value of one (see Appendix B). 
3.2 Treatment Variable 
The explanatory variable of interest (or “treatment” variable), IMFprogram, is an indicator that 
takes the value of one if country i was under an IMF program for at least five months in year 
t (as in Dreher 2006). Following the previous literature, our definition encompasses all IMF 
                                                                                             
8 S&P covers most high and middle-income countries. The IMF itself – jointly with the World Bank – rates the risk 
of debt distress under the so-called Debt Sustainability Framework (see Lang and Presbitero 2018). 
9 Fitch Rating is dual-headquartered in London, UK and New York, USA.  
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programs under any of the following facilities: Stand-By-Arrangements (SBA), the Extended 
Fund Facility (EFF), the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), or the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility (PRGF). In alternative specifications, we also use the variable IMFapproval, 
which indicates only the year in which an IMF program was initially approved. To corroborate 
our arguments concerning biasing factors and channels, we also use an alternative monthly 
dataset in which we use information on the exact date an IMF program was approved. The 
latter we coded based on the IMF’s Monitoring of Fund Arrangements database (IMF 2016b). 
3.3 Endogenous Selection into IMF Programs 
We want to know whether the presence of an IMF program in year t in country i affects the 
country’s credit rating at the end of year t. The fundamental methodological issue with this 
question is that selection into IMF programs is obviously not random. On the contrary, 
“treated” countries typically experience an economic crisis when entering into a program, and 
the more severe the crisis is, the more likely it is that a country is under an IMF program. As a 
consequence, simple comparisons between treated and non-treated country-year observations 
will not yield causal effects but capture the negative bias resulting from omitted variables and 
reverse causality. The deteriorating economic conditions that make a country more likely to 
enter an IMF program negatively affect a country’s creditworthiness, and a country with lower 
creditworthiness is thus more likely to turn to the IMF. In the following, we show why 
controlling for selection-on-observables is insufficient and propose an alternative strategy. 
To begin with, we use our monthly data on sovereign credit ratings and on the exact date that 
countries enter into an IMF arrangement to illustrate the problem graphically. Figure 2 plots 
the average behavior of credit ratings around IMFapprovals. Specifically, on the y-axis the 
figure depicts the unweighted average of the month-specific deviations from each country’s 
mean credit rating in the 1990–2013 period over all countries that received an IMF program at 
least once in this period.10 For all countries, month on the x-axis is set to zero for the month in 
which the country’s first IMF program in the observation period started. 
Several important observations are evident. First, credit ratings appear to capture balance-of-
payment crises well. As one would expect, countries enter into IMF agreements several 
months after economic crises hit and creditworthiness collapses. On average, countries’ credit 
ratings deteriorate by about three notches in the approximately one and a half years preceding 
                                                                                             
10 Examining the deviation from the country mean is equivalent to using country fixed effects in a panel regression. 
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the IMF program’s beginning. Second, IMF programs start at a low point, but creditworthiness 
continues to fall for several months thereafter. After about a year, ratings seem to begin 
recovering. Third, this recovery process is on average rather slow: It takes several years until 
creditworthiness is restored to pre-crisis levels. The figure also illustrates the problem of 
endogenous selection into the treatment. Credit ratings are at a low level and in an ongoing 
process of decline during the early months of IMF programs for reasons at least partly 
unrelated to the IMF program itself. Given that the average IMF program in our sample lasts 
for about four years (with a large variance), any simple regression of credit ratings on a 
variable indicating the start or the presence of an IMF program is biased by the fact that IMF 
programs typically start when ratings are already low and in further decline. 
Figure 2 – Rating Dynamics Around Starts of IMF Programs 
 
Note: The figure plots the unweighted mean across countries of the month-specific 
deviation from each country’s average S&P credit rating in the 1990-2013 period on the 
y-axis. The number of months around the start of the country’s first IMF program of this 
period is on the x-axis. Sample restricted to countries with at least one IMF program. 
 
A basic model designed to estimate the effect of IMFprogram on Rating based on controlling 
for selection-on-observables looks like the following: 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡∗= β 𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑿′𝑖,𝑡−1γ + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (1) 
In a regression equation of this type 𝑿′ is a vector of country-year specific observable control 
variables and 𝛿𝑖  and 𝜃𝑡 stand for country fixed effects and year fixed effects, which control for 
unobserved time-invariant country characteristics and for global shocks that affect all 
countries equally. 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the i.i.d. error term and t* indicates the value at the end of year t. 
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We expect that the bias introduced by endogenous selection into the program is reduced but 
not eliminated by fixed effects and controls variables. Formally: 
 
𝐸(𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡𝜀𝑖,𝑡) < 𝐸(𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡𝜀𝑖,𝑡|𝛿𝑖, 𝜃𝑡) < 𝐸(𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡𝜀𝑖,𝑡|𝑿
′, 𝛿𝑖, 𝜃𝑡) < 0 (2) 
 
It is natural to expect that fixed effects reduce the negative bias in this estimation: Global 
business cycles could affect both creditworthiness and the demand for IMF programs and, 
more importantly, typical IMF program countries tend to be economically weaker and thus 
less creditworthy because of time-invariant country characteristics. Furthermore, it is 
plausible that country-year specific control variables further reduce this bias because they 
make treatment and control groups comparable in terms of observables. Nevertheless, such 
an empirical strategy is insufficient and problematic for at least three reasons. 
First, the available cross-country panel data on macroeconomic and political fundamentals are 
unlikely to capture all information that ratings agencies, national policy-makers, and IMF staff 
had available at the specific time decisions about creditworthiness and IMF participation were 
made. This includes information on context-specific and country-specific economic 
vulnerabilities or political events that rating agencies consider when assessing 
creditworthiness and that decision-makers in the IMF and in national governments take into 
account when deciding on starting or continuing IMF programs.  
Second, even if all relevant economic and political fundamentals could be observed and 
measured at the country-year level, this would not necessarily solve the problem. Most of 
these indicators are available only at the yearly level – if they are available for a large panel at 
all – and ignore the crucial dynamics within a year that we highlight in Figure 2. Economic 
and political fundamentals in countries that enter IMF programs are likely to deteriorate 
quicker during the year. A focus on country-year specific means of observable controls would 
hence not be able to control for this unobserved heterogeneity between treatment and control 
group. 
Third, many of the control variables that in this particular setting are needed to increase the 
comparability of treatment and control groups are “bad controls” because they are themselves 
plausible outcomes of the treatment. As discussed above, the literature suggests that ratings 
are a function of many of the same economic and political fundamentals that the IMF directly 
affects. If, for instance, IMF programs increased growth and rating agencies improved their 
credit assessment because of this, holding growth constant would prevent the regression from 
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attributing the positive effect of the IMF on creditworthiness via the growth channel. This 
problem is mitigated but not entirely solved by lagging these variables by one or two periods, 
because IMF programs last for multiple years and both ratings and fundamentals exhibit some 
persistence.11 
In sum, estimation strategies that rely on controlling for selection on observables alone cannot 
adequately address the question at hand. Ideally, we would want a mechanism that randomly 
assigns countries that are on comparable trajectories to an IMF program. We approach such 
an ideal assignment mechanism by employing an instrumental variable (IV) that changes the 
likelihood that a particular country receives a program based on factors that are exogenous to 
the trajectory of this particular country. 
3.4 Identification 
Our instrumental variable strategy combines spatial and temporal variation via an interaction 
term. The IV is based on Lang (2016) and is defined as: 
 
𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡  × 𝑙𝑛(𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡)  (3) 
 
IMFprobability is a country’s probability of having participated in an IMF program in the past, 
defined as the share of past years that a country was under an IMF program.12 IMFliquidity 
denotes the IMF’s time-varying liquidity ratio, defined as the organization’s liquid resources 
divided by its liquid liabilities. It is a measure of the amount of liquid resources the Fund has 
available for its loan programs in a given year. The data are collected from individual IMF 
Annual Reports (1973-2013) and from the IMF International Financial Statistics. 
The IV strategy builds on the finding that countries that have received IMF programs in the 
past are more likely to receive them in the present. Variables indicating past IMF participation 
like IMFprobability are thus strong predictors of present IMFprogram indicators (Berger, de 
Haan, and Sturm 2005; Bird, Hussain, and Joyce 2004). The literature explains this finding by 
pointing to “recidivism,” political favoritism and staff incentives (Dreher and Lang 2016, 
                                                                                             
11 Additionally, holding 𝑿′ constant if IMF programs have an effect on the intermediate outcome 𝑿′creates the 
problem that treatment and control groups will differ in potential outcomes. The coefficient of the treatment will 
compare units that are identical in 𝑿′ but differ in IMFprogram. If, however, the treatment affects 𝑿′, then potential 
outcomes of these units will automatically differ and this coefficient will not estimate a causal effect. For more 
details on this point see chapter 9 in Gelman and Hill (2007) or chapter 3.2.3 in Angrist and Pischke (2008). 
12 We start the count of years of past IMF participation in 1973 and thus 15 years before our observation period 
starts. This ensures that the variable does not fluctuate strongly from one year to the next for the early years of the 
sample and increases the plausibility of the exclusion restriction further because the value is determined by earlier 
periods. 
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Steinwand and Stone 2008). The more specific finding that we exploit for identification is that 
the influence of prior IMFprobability on present IMFprogram participation differs conditional 
on the year-specific extent of the IMF’s liquidity. 
Specifically, in years with relatively low levels of IMFliquidity, programs tend to go to 
countries that have received more programs in the past. Then, IMFprobability is a strong 
predictor of IMFprogram. But a country’s IMF participation history is a weaker predictor of a 
present IMFprogram in years in which the IMF’s liquidity is high. A plausible explanation for 
this pattern is that in high liquidity years, the IMF can be more generous and has an increased 
incentive to look for additional program countries beyond its more regular clientele. The 
public choice literature on international organizations emphasizes that IMF staff faces 
bureaucratic incentives to expand their field of activity.13 These incentives as well as the 
financial opportunities to do so are particularly strong when liquidity is high. In line with this, 
we find that in these years the IMF is more likely to give programs to countries that otherwise 
receive them less often. A country’s IMF participation history is then a weaker predictor of 
IMFprogram. Figure 3 illustrates this relationship by plotting the marginal effects of 
IMFprobability on IMFprogram conditional on the level of IMFliquidity. 
Figure 3 – Illustrating the First Stage Effect 
  
Note: The figure plots the marginal effects of IMFprobability on IMFprogram for varying levels 
of IMFliquidity (along with 95% confidence intervals). It corresponds to the first-stage regression 
of our baseline IV regression, as reported below in column 6 of Table 1. 
                                                                                             
13 This literature (surveyed in Dreher and Lang 2016) argues that international bureaucrats face incentives to 
increase their budgets, remits, staff, relevance, and political influence and thereby contribute to the expansion of 
IOs in size, power and responsibilities in an increasing number of countries. Anecdotal evidence we gathered in 
personal conversations with IMF staff support this view. Inside the IMF, there is a certain concern to lose relevance 
when the IMF’s resources are unused. Several staff members described attempts to make loans more attractive in 
recent, high liquidity years (conversations in Washington, D.C., between November 2016 and November 2017). 
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We run two-stage least squares (2SLS) panel regressions over an unbalanced sample of 100 
countries in the 1988–2013 period. This gives us the first and second stage equation: 




+ 𝛽2𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖  + 𝜏𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (5) 
These regressions control for the initial, pre-determined IMFprobability in both stages while 
year fixed effects absorb the level effect of IMFliquidity. Hence, for identification we only need 
to assume the exogeneity of the interaction term conditional on its two constituent terms.  
 
𝐸 (𝜀𝑖,𝑡 𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡| 𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡, 𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡) = 0     (6) 
 
This IV strategy follows a difference-in-differences logic as in Nunn and Qian (2014) or Temple 
and Van de Sijpe (2017), and is similar to shift-share or Bartik instruments (Goldsmith-
Pinkham et al. 2018). In our case, for the exclusion restriction to be violated, omitted variables 
would have to be correlated with the year-specific IMF liquidity and affect creditworthiness 
differently in countries with different levels of IMF probability.14 This conditional relationship is 
highly unlikely because, first, the main sources of variation in the IMF’s liquidity ratio are very 
distant to events in individual country-years. Second, even if unobserved determinants of 
creditworthiness were correlated with the overall IMF liquidity ratio, then their effect on 
country-year specific creditworthiness would, in addition, have to vary depending on the 
country-year specific level of IMFprobability. Nevertheless, skeptical readers may worry that 
such a relationship exists and violates the common trend assumption. In the following, we 
offer both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence to counter such worries.  
First, note that the main sources of variation in the IMF’s liquidity ratio is an institutional rule 
in the IMF’s Articles of Agreement that requires the Fund to review the quota subscriptions of 
its members every five years. Following quota reviews that propose increases, members 
commit more resources leading to an increase in the Fund’s liquid resources. The timing of the 
subsequent spikes in liquidity, which emerge several years after the review, is thus plausibly 
exogenous to creditworthiness dynamics in individual countries. The second source of 
variation in the liquidity ratio are repayments of extraordinarily large, individual loans. While 
the vast majority of individual repayments are too small to significantly affect the IMF’s 
overall liquidity, some repayments of large loans of economically large countries can make a 
                                                                                             
14 Note that a global trend that correlates with the IMF’s liquidity and with global rating trends does not threaten 
the exclusion restriction. 
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noticeable difference for the IMF’s liquid liabilities. However, the timing of these transactions 
is agreed upon years in advance. We consider it implausible that the predetermined 
repayment schedule the Fund develops with a small number of economically large program 
countries is associated with individual future creditworthiness dynamics in other countries.15 
Furthermore, our results are robust to omitting the cases with large repayments and to using 
liquid resources without dividing by liquid liabilities. 
Figure 4 – The IMF’s Liquidity Ratio and Trends in Credit Ratings 
 
Note: The dashed line is the time series of the IMF’s liquidity ratio. In addition, the figure plots 
mean credit ratings in the group of countries that never receive a program (upper line, green), that 
have a low probability of receiving a program (middle line, yellow, below 85th percentile), and a 
high probability (red, above 85th percentile). Results are similar when using other cutoff percentiles.  
 
A recent paper by Christian and Barrett (2017) highlights potential problems with interaction 
instruments combining cross-sectional and temporal variation. These can arise if a long-run 
trend in the time-series dominates year-on-year variation and this long-run trend overlaps 
with a trend in the outcome in low or high probability countries. This is why for Figure 4 we 
separate countries into three groups: those that never have an IMF program, those with a low 
probability of having one, and those with a high probability. The figure shows no apparent 
overlap in long-run trends in any of these groups with the IMFliquidity time series. Generally, 
IMFliquidity exhibits substantial year-on-year variation. We also find no correlations with 
global economic trends like global GDP growth (r = -.14) or the number of systemic banking 
                                                                                             
15 For the sake of completeness, note that there are two additional minor sources of variation in the IMF’s liquidity 
ratio. Liquid resources can also vary if the Fund changes the basket of currencies that it considers “usable.” The 
liquid liabilities’ second source of variation is the Fund’s borrowing from its members. While total borrowing by 
the Fund is zero in many years, its average share of the liquid liabilities is approximately 15%. 
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crises (r = -.03). To further rule out that these global trends interact with a country’s IMF 
participation history in a way that threatens the exclusion restriction, we also interact them 
with IMFprobability and add these interactions as control variables in robustness tests. 
To demonstrate that the year-on-year variation in IMFliquidity rather than a long-run trend 
drives the first-stage effect, we examine a first-stage specification for which we interact 
IMFprobability with different leads and lags of IMFliquidity. Figure 5 shows that there are no 
signs of a worrying significant pre-trend. The most negative coefficient, and the only 
statistically significant one, is the interaction of the probability with the liquidity in the same 
year. The relationship is smaller and statistically insignificant in the subsequent years. 
Figure 5 – Effect of Probability (t) with Leads and Lags of IMF Liquidity on IMF program 
 
Note: The dependent variable is whether country i had an IMF program in t. The figure plots first-
stage coefficients (along with 95% confidence intervals) of the interaction of IMFprobability in t with 
IMFliquidity in t-2, t-1, t, t+1, t+2. 
 
Another recent paper by Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2018) shows that it is important when 
using Bartik instruments to examine to what degree the first stage is driven by outliers in the 
cross-section or time-series. While our approach is somewhat different to a standard Bartik 
instrument, we address this point in section 4.3 and show that the first stage is not driven by 
individual observations, by omitting potentially atypical observations and analyzing partial 
leverage plots.  This highlights that there is a large number of “compliers,” and that the 
changes in the IMF’s liquidity affect the likelihood of receiving a program for a wide range of 




We begin by looking at the simple correlation between the treatment variable, IMFprogram, 
and the S&P credit rating as the outcome. Column 1 in Table 1 shows that the correlation is 
negative with a large coefficient of -6.256. The subsequent specifications support the conjecture 
of a large downward bias in the coefficient when not accounting for endogenous selection into 
IMF programs. Conditioning on country fixed effects in column 2, plausibly eliminating an 
important part of this bias, drastically decreases the point estimate in absolute terms to -1.422. 
This shows that the unconditional correlation in column 1 largely picks up time-invariant 
differences between countries. Global time trends that affect both credit ratings and countries’ 
likelihood of receiving an IMF loan, in contrast, have no substantial impact in this setting. We 
net these out by additionally including year fixed effects in column 3 and find that the 
coefficient of interest changes only marginally.16 
Before adding control variables, we restrain the sample to those countries for which all control 
variables are available in column 4. This barely affects the coefficient, showing that sample 
selection depending on the availability of control variables is not a concern. The fifth 
specification then adds a comprehensive set of country-year specific economic and political 
controls (following Fuchs and Gehring 2017, see Appendix D for details). The aim is to 
condition on the initial state in which countries enter into an IMF program, and further reduce 
the (negative) selection bias. As IMF programs on average last about four years, we lag the 
variables by five years to mitigate bad control concerns. Consistent with the hypothesized 
negative selection bias, the coefficient of interest decreases in absolute terms, but remains 
negative and statistically significant at the one percent level. Thus, when approaching the 
selection problem via conditioning on observables, we would still conclude that IMF programs 
have an economically small, yet statistically significant, negative effect on creditworthiness. 
Nevertheless, as we argue above, this coefficient is likely biased because of this approach’s 
inability to address selection on unobservables like dynamics during the year and because of 
the potential bad control problem in creates. 
                                                                                             
16 This also suggests that it is unlikely that such time trends threaten the exclusion restriction underlying the 
subsequent IV estimations. 
Table 1 – Baseline 
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IMF program  -6.256 -1.422 -1.311 -1.315 -1.011 0.404 
  [0.525] [0.282] [0.300] [0.359] [0.252] [0.885] 
  {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.648} 
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls (t-5) No No No No Yes No 
Observations 2047 2047 2047 1294 1294 2045 
Adjusted R-squared  0.206 0.082 0.116 0.130 0.280  
First Stage Results 
 
      
IMF liquidity x IMF probability      -0.458 
       [0.076] 
       {0.000} 
IMF probability       3.721 
       [0.581] 
 
     {0.000} 
K-P underidentification LM-statistic      16.091 
K-P underidentification p-value      0.000 
K-P weak identification F-statistic      35.923 
Notes: The dependent variable is the country’s long-term foreign-currency rating by Standard and Poor’s. Standard errors clustered at the country level are 
displayed in brackets, p-values in curly brackets. Appendix D provides a comprehensive list of all economic and political controls added in column 5. 
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The next step implements our instrumental variable approach. The first stage, reported in the 
bottom panel of the table, shows that the interaction term is negative and statistically 
significant at the one percent level. This indicates that in high liquidity years, the potential 
program country’s participation history in IMF programs is indeed a less important predictor 
of receiving a program. The IV passes the underidentification test with a p-value of less than 
0.001, and the Kleibergen-Paap (K-P) F-statistic testing for weak identification is about 35 and 
thus well above the rule of thumb of 10, as well as above the more conservative threshold of 
16.66 proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005). 
The second stage of this regression shows that the coefficient of interest now turns 
substantially more positive, with a value of 0.404. Hence, the point estimates move exactly as 
one would expect in the presence of negative selection bias, which was only partly captured 
by fixed effects and conditioning on observables. Overall, we thus find no evidence for a 
negative IMF program effect on a country’s creditworthiness; if anything, the point estimate 
indicates a small positive, yet statistically insignificant, relationship. The relatively large 
standard error suggests that this insignificant aggregate effect masks large heterogeneities 
between IMF programs and the ways they affect creditworthiness. For that reason, we 
continue with examining the underlying channels.  
4.2 Channels: Adjustment vs. Signaling 
Our theoretical considerations discussed above distinguish two channels how IMF 
interventions can influence creditworthiness. First, as IMF programs often lead to far-reaching 
economic reforms they can influence a country’s creditworthiness via the implementation of 
immediate adjustments. In the previous literature, IMF programs were associated with 
improvements in certain economic fundamentals, but also with political instability and lower 
growth rates. Second, an IMF program is also a signal that can affect expectations. Independent 
of its actual economic effects, the mere presence of the IMF conveys information about the 
country’s future policy path to those assessing its creditworthiness. 
To differentiate between these two channels, we begin by investigating the short-term 
adjustment effects of an IMF program on the most important economic factors determining 
creditworthiness in our sample. We focus on GDP, inflation, the change in government debt 
and the current account balance, as in the rating literature these are cited as the most important 
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predictors of sovereign credit ratings (Archer, Biglaiser, and DeRouen 2007; Cantor and Packer 
1996; Hill, Brooks, and Faff 2010). 17 










(1) (2) (3) (4) 
IMF program -4.187 0.067 1.776 4.187 
  [1.292] [0.044] [2.265] [3.432] 
  {0.001} {0.129} {0.433} {0.223} 
Observations 2032 1796 1840 1808 
K-P underid. LM 16.098 15.983 16.397 16.637 
K-P underid. p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
K-P weak id. F 35.898 35.383 37.598 38.032 
Note: Results are based on the baseline IV regression (Table 1, column 6), but with other dependent variables. 
Standard errors clustered at the country level in brackets, p-values in curly brackets. 
 
Table 2 shows the results based on the baseline IV specification when the outcome variable is 
substituted with these variables. For inflation, changes in government spending, and the 
current account balance, the estimates are statistically insignificant. There is, however, a 
negative effect on growth rates of GDP in the short-run. In this sample, IMF programs induce 
growth rates that are about four percentage points lower compared to the counterfactual.18 In 
the average IMF program country (where growth rates fluctuate more than in countries that 
never receive IMF programs) this is equivalent to about one standard deviation. It is thus a 
large, albeit not unrealistically large effect considering previous results in the literature on this 
relationship (Barro and Lee 2005, Dreher 2006). Considering also the substantial extent of 
budget cuts, tax increases and other measures with potentially short-run contractionary 
consequences that IMF programs typically entail.  
                                                                                             
17 Note that we can replicate the explanatory power of these variables in our sample. We find significant associations 
with S&P ratings for all variables except the change in government debt. In a simple OLS regression of S&P ratings 
the variables explain 75 percent of the variance. In an analogous fixed-effects regression the within-R2 equals .31 
while the overall-R2 equals .74. Interestingly, most of the variation is explained by the variables indicating level 
and growth rate of GDP: These two variables alone explain 71 percent of the variation in an OLS rating regression 
and 27 percent of the within-country variation in a fixed-effects regression. 
18 Note that IMF programs last for multiple years, and thus most of the country-year observations with an active 
program are years in which IMF programs were already active in the year(s) before. The estimates, thus, also 
includes lagged effects of previous program years. 
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Many program countries feature a large public sector, whose size IMF conditions often reduce 
(Rickard and Caraway 2018). IMF staff recently argued that the IMF underestimated the size 
of the fiscal multiplier in past crises and thus projected smaller negative effects of fiscal 
austerity on GDP than those that eventually materialized (Blanchard and Leigh 2013). Many 
program countries also rely on debt-financed growth in the years before they start IMF 
programs, and cannot maintain such growth under a program as the IMF often sets limits on 
new debt (Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King 2016).  
To sum up, the economic adjustments that crisis countries under IMF programs typically 
implement lead to lower growth and no statistically significant short-term improvements in 
the other major predictors of creditworthiness. 
Credit ratings are a direct function of changes in GDP (as is stated in the official manuals of all 
agencies), which is why rating agencies normally respond to such sharp growth reductions by 
lowering their assessments of creditworthiness.19 Against this backdrop, it is remarkable that 
the coefficient on IMF programs in the creditworthiness regressions is not negative. This 
suggests that IMF programs cause negative economic adjustments that would usually lead to 
declining creditworthiness, but also convey a positive signaling effect that prevents this 
decline. The result is an aggregate null effect. IMF programs appear to function as a “seal of 
approval” that helps program countries to maintain their level of creditworthiness despite 
contractionary adjustments.  
Ideally, we would want to estimate this signaling effect by netting out the effect of IMF-
induced economic adjustments. The results in Table 2 show that IMF programs reduce GDP 
growth. As growth itself also is a strong predictor of ratings, it is an intermediate outcome 
affected by the treatment. In a potential outcome framework, we cannot, however, estimate 
the exact effect size and significance of a particular channel. Adding GDP growth to the same 
equation does not necessarily yield the conditional causal effect of IMF program.20 Nonetheless, 
under the assumption that a potential “bad control” bias is sufficiently small, the change in 
the estimated treatment effect can be informative about the role that signaling plays beyond 
immediate economic adjustments. 
                                                                                             
19 According to the manual published by Standard & Poor’s a credit rating can be best understood as a scoring 
model. There is an economic and a political dimension, which are each composed of different factors. For each 
factor the country gets assigned a grade, and the factors are summed up to a grade for the given dimension. 
20 See the identification section, Gelman and Hill (2007), as well as Angrist and Pischke (2008). 
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To examine the role of signaling, we employ two different strategies in Table 3. First, we add 
GDP per capita and GDP contraction21 as control variables to the baseline IV regression. 
Compared to the baseline specification in column 1, the point estimate turns substantially 
larger and statistically significant with a p-value of 0.052 (column 2). The coefficient becomes 
only slightly larger (with p=0.017) when adding the additional channels from Table 2, 
suggesting that GDP is indeed a main mechanism. This would indicate that the positive signal 
the IMF conveys corresponds to an improvement of about two rating notches, e.g. from CCC+ 
to B.  
Table 3 – Adjustment vs. Signaling 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IMF program (t) 0.328 1.675 2.111   
 [0.879] [0.862] [0.883]   
 {0.709} {0.052} {0.017}   
GDP contraction (t)  -0.115 -0.112   
  [0.028] [0.030] 
  
  {0.000} {0.000} 
  
GDP per capita (ln) (t)  6.790 6.865   
 [1.225] [1.322]   
 {0.000} {0.000}   
GDP contraction, 
IMF induced (t) 
   0.080 0.016 
   [0.216] [0.147] 
   {0.712} {0.911} 
GDP contraction, 
residual of IMF induced (t) 
    -0.122 
    [0.022] 
    
 {0.000} 
Country and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Additional Channels (t) No No Yes No No 
Observations 2016 2016 1726 2016 2016 
K-P underid. LM 16.060 13.314 11.814 7.493 7.493 
K-P underid. p 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.006 
K-P weak id. F 35.755 26.698 23.709 11.326 11.326 
Notes: The dependent variable is the country’s long-term foreign-currency rating by S&P. In columns 1-2, IMF 
program is instrumented by IV; in column 3-4, GDP contraction is instrumented by IV. Standard errors clustered 
at the country level are displayed in brackets, p-values in curly brackets. “Additional channels” include the 
variables inflation, change in government debt, and current account balance from Table 2. 
 
Second, we use the IV directly as an instrument for IMF induced GDP contractions. As the IV 
affects IMF programs and programs affect growth, this approach isolates the variation in GDP 
                                                                                             
21 We use the variable GDP contraction, the additive inverse of GDP growth, to simplify the interpretation of results. 
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growth that is due to IMF programs. Column 4 shows that such contractions have a small and 
insignificant effect on credit ratings. In column 5, we additionally include the first stage 
residuals; they capture the variation in GDP contractions that is not explained by the IV and 
thus not induced by IMF programs. These residuals are associated with significantly lower 
ratings. In contrast, the IMF induced GDP contraction remains small and insignificant. While 
GDP contractions directly map onto ratings in normal times, the finding that GDP contractions 
under IMF programs have no such effect is consistent with a positive signaling effect. 
In sum, these three pieces of evidence point towards a positive signaling effect. First, IMF 
programs reduce contemporary growth rates, which usually leads to rating downgrades. The 
fact that the net effect of IMF programs on ratings is slightly positive and statistically 
insignificant suggests that programs have some kind of additional, positive effect on 
creditworthiness assessments. Second, and in line with this, we find that economic 
contractions caused by the IMF do not lead to a decline in creditworthiness. As long as growth 
reductions occur under an IMF program, investors are more likely to regard them as part of a 
positive adjustment process. Third, and further supporting this, IMF programs are related to 
improvements in creditworthiness when conditioning on those short-term economic 
contractions.  
Albeit imperfect, all of these results are consistent with a positive signal conveyed by the IMF’s 
presence. To expand on these IV estimations, the next section uses a monthly event-based 
specification as an alternative approach to more directly examine signaling effects. 
4.3 Event-based Evidence on Signaling Using Monthly Data 
So far, we have used data at the yearly level, because information on the IMF’s liquidity ratio, 
which was needed for the construction of the IV, is only available on an annual basis. For both 
credit ratings and IMF programs, however, we were able to collect data at a finer-grained level. 
The variation of these higher-frequency data allows us to apply an alternative method, which 
– like our IV approach – is able to control for selection on unobservables. The identifying 
assumption it is based on, however, is completely different. 
In these regressions, which are based on data at the monthly level, our dependent variable is 
the S&P rating at the end of month m. The treatment variable is the country-month specific 
variable IMFagreementi, m, indicating the month in which an IMF program was agreed upon. 
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We employ an event-time specification and add IMFagreementi, m, as well as 11 lags (indicated 
by l) and leads (indicated by -l) of it. The monthly frequency of these data allows us to include 
month fixed effects (𝜇𝑚) and, crucially, country-times-year fixed effects (denoted as 𝜃𝑖,𝑡  ). This 
means that in the most conservative specification based on these data we estimate: 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑚 = ∑ 𝛽r 𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑚−𝑙
11
𝑟=−11
+ 𝜃𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜇𝑚 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑚         (7) 
Conceptually, the demeaning implemented by this fixed effect estimator is equivalent to 
controlling for all potentially biasing factors at the country-year level. The only variation that 
remains are the dynamics within country-years and we thus compare ratings in different 
months within the same country-year observation. Accordingly, the coefficients 𝛽𝑟 estimate 
the extent to which the rating in the months around the start of an IMF program deviated from 
the mean rating of country i in year t. 
Figure 6 – Event-based Identification 
 
Note: The figure plots the coefficients of different lags and leads of IMF agreement in a regression of monthly 
S&P ratings. See regression equation 8. 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the results of this regression by plotting all coefficients 𝛽𝑟 and smoothed 
confidence intervals until the 99 percent level.22 We discuss these coefficients in ‘chronological’ 
                                                                                             
22 The regression output is reported in Table 8 in Appendix G. In this table, before we turn to the results of the 
regression specified in equation 8, we first run the regression with alternative, less conservative sets of fixed effects. 
These results show that the point estimates become more positive, the more biasing variation we reduce by adding 
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order. First, in the period between eleven months and four months before the start of an IMF 
program no significant deviation from the country-year mean rating is visible. Then, starting 
three months before the agreement, a negative pre-trend is visible. It is interesting that this 
negative pre-trend is statistically significant even though all variation between treated and 
non-treated country-years is eliminated. Countries whose creditworthiness collapses during 
the year are thus more likely to receive an IMF program within the next three months. This 
shows that, even if all country-year specific characteristics are held constant, the mean 
trajectory of treated countries before the treatment start exhibits negative dynamics, which 
make the agreement more likely but are not caused by it.  
Nevertheless, the regression yields an interesting pattern at the time of the treatment start. The 
most negative point estimate for 𝛽𝑟 appears in the month in which the IMF agreement is 
approved (i.e., for l = 0). As soon as the program starts, the point estimates increase (for l > 0) 
and increasingly move to zero. The trend of decreasing credit ratings goes into reverse exactly 
when the IMF program starts.23 Eight months after program approval (l = 8) the negative 
deviation from the mean rating of the year is no longer statistically significant. 
What does this pattern tell us? First, the negative pre-trend shows that the timing of IMF 
agreements within a given country-year observation is not random; IMF programs typically 
start at a low point. Second, while this negative pre-trend negatively biases the absolute values 
of the coefficient estimates for the variables indicating the (post-)treatment period, they start 
increasing in relative terms as soon as the IMF program starts. Even though IMF programs are 
thus endogenously timed in spite of all country-year-specific variation being netted out, it 
would be an improbable coincidence to observe that the trend reversal happens exactly after 
the treatment starts if the treatment itself did not have any impact. As in the IV regressions, 
the evidence is thus not consistent with a “stigma” effect. On the contrary, interpreted in 
concert with the above estimates on the country-year level these specifications suggest that 
IMF programs succeed in “cushioning” against further deteriorations in sovereign 
creditworthiness. As changes in economic fundamentals (adjustment effects) do not take effect 
                                                                                             
more fixed effects. Note that the idea behind plotting smoothed confidence intervals is to visualize statistical 
uncertainty without setting arbitrary thresholds for p-values. (This is analogous to our choice in the main tables to 
not report statistical significance by means of ‘significance stars’ for certain p-value thresholds, but by directly 
reporting p-values.)  
23 Note that our background research suggests that agencies take on average one month to update their ratings. 
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within such a short time period, the trend reversal can be best thought of as a signaling effect 
attributed to the IMF intervention. 
To scrutinize this interpretation and better understand the signal that the IMF’s presence 
conveys, the subsequent section analyzes the statements that rating agencies issue when 
explaining their decisions. Furthermore, remember that our main IV estimate is centered 
around zero, but with a substantial degree of uncertainty. A plausible reason is that IMF 
programs are not homogenous treatments and differ substantially between countries (Stone 
2008). Hence, the text analysis can also shed light on the circumstances under which IMF 
programs are perceived as a positive signal. 
4.4 Text Analysis 
The econometric results of the previous sections suggest that IMF programs send a positive 
signal to the agencies assessing a country’s creditworthiness. To see whether this is reflected 
in the agencies’ reasoning, we evaluate rating statements that are issued when a rating or its 
outlook are changed. We use the Dow Jones Factiva database for this assessment. 
Initially, we study these statements in an exploratory way. (See Appendix H for details and a 
list of exemplary statements.) It becomes evident that rating agencies indeed often link the 
IMF’s presence to positive expectations. We find many statements in which they state that they 
expect that the IMF program will help the country in the near future. Examples include 
statements like: “[w]e think the new IMF program [….] will help in addressing fiscal and 
external imbalances“ (S&P on Ghana in 2015), or “the International Monetary Fund program 
will serve as a policy anchor for fiscal consolidation” (S&P on Albania in 2014). 
Furthermore, we noticed that several of these statements emphasize the IMF’s role in helping 
countries to overcome short-term liquidity problems; others emphasize the increased 
likelihood of successful reform implementation. For example, with regard to Sri Lanka, 
Moody’s stated in 2016: “the IMF program will alleviate Sri Lanka's external liquidity 
pressures.” For Egypt the same agency in the same year expected the IMF program to “support 
the implementation of fiscal and economic reforms.” We find many more such examples in 
which the liquidity aspect and/or the reform aspect of IMF programs is emphasized. 
Based on this initial inspection, we then conduct a more systematic analysis. We extract all 
available articles on Factiva using all combinations of the search terms “IMF/International 
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Monetary Fund,” “rating,” “program,” “reform,” in English or German and in the industry 
category “Rating Agency.” We then use a Python script to extract the paragraphs before and 
after statements mention the IMF. This approach yields 117 statements. Two research 
assistants then coded these statements following a pre-defined codebook (see Appendix I for 
details). The aim of this coding was, first, to distinguish negative, neutral/mixed and positive 
associations between IMF programs and changes in credit ratings. Second, it also aimed to 
differentiate between texts mentioning the liquidity aspect of IMF programs, the reform 
aspect, or both. The codebook was designed to be conservative in the sense of biasing against 
findings in support of our priors resulting from the econometric analysis: in case of doubt 
about the association between IMF programs and the rating, the statement was categorized as 
“no clear association with rating.” If it was not obvious whether the statement relates to 
liquidity or reform aspects of IMF programs, it was put in a residual category. 
Figure 7 – Text Analysis of Rating Statements 
 
 
Figure 7 graphically illustrates the results of this exercise. The first and most noticeable finding 
is that the vast majority of statements attribute a positive effect to IMF programs. Of 117 
statements, only one statement notes that the IMF’s presence negatively influences the rating. 
For 32 statements it was not possible to conclusively determine whether the agency considered 
the IMF program to have a positive or a negative effect on the rating. The second finding is 
that rating agencies often link the reforms expected to materialize under IMF programs to 
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positive trends in credit ratings. There thus seems to be more to IMF programs for credit 
agencies than just the temporary increase in liquidity they come with. It is also apparent that 
the statements about “reforms” or “reforms and liquidity” are with very few exceptions 
positive. Statements concerning liquidity are slightly more mixed, and the residual category, 
quite naturally, captures a number of neutral statements in which no clear association could 
be noted. The expectation of successful reforms thus appears to be a significant part of the 
IMF’s positive signaling effect on creditworthiness assessments. 
Overall, the text analysis is in line with the results of the econometric analysis and exemplary 
statements like the following illustrate the effect we find: “We view the risk of another default 
in the next two to three years as diminished due to the Ukrainian authorities’ commitment to 
the reforms set out in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) program.” S&P made this 
statement in October 2015 during a period of substantial GDP contraction under multiple 
consecutive IMF programs in Ukraine: The country’s growth rate stood at -6.6 percent in 2014 
and at -9.8 percent in 2015. Nevertheless, S&P improved its credit rating because it expected 
reforms under IMF programs to enhance sovereign creditworthiness. 
Our results in their entirety suggest that this piece of anecdotal evidence is accurately 
representative of a general pattern: IMF programs, rather than coming with a stigma, arouse 
expectations of successful reform implementation and thereby send a positive signal that, 
despite substantial economic contractions under IMF programs, cushions assessments of 
sovereign creditworthiness. 
4.5 Robustness 
This section assesses the robustness of the prior estimations, focusing on the baseline 
instrumental variable results presented in Section 4.1. As a first step, we use alternative 
outcome variables. Analysts at S&P might have a particular view on the effect of IMF 
programs that is not generally shared by other analysts and investors. This is why in this 
section we substitute the S&P ratings with ratings from other agencies and with assessments 
from professional investors. First, we take the ratings by Moody’s and Fitch, the other two 
major agencies of the “Big Three.” Although the credit rating of these three agencies are highly 
correlated, there are some differences (especially in times of crisis) and we want to be sure that 
these are not driving our results. Second, as cultural proximity of analysts to rated countries 
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has been shown to affect country ratings (Fuchs and Gehring 2017), we also look at non-US 
rating agencies as their analysts come from a different cultural background. Analysts at the 
US-based “Big Three” and at the IMF often have similar educational or professional 
backgrounds (or have worked for the respective other institution), and might thus share a 
common ideological mindset that need not represent general investor sentiment.  
Third, even though we argue that sovereign credit ratings are the most useful measure of a 
country’s creditworthiness for our research question, it would be reassuring if the results hold 
for alternative measures. While ratings are hard-wired into investment decisions, regulations 
and company charters, they are officially marketed as mere opinions. Investors with “skin in 
the game” could deviate from them in cases where they are not bound by regulation. As credit 
agencies have been blamed for being either too harsh or too reluctant to change ratings in crisis 
periods, investors might come to different assessments. This is why we digitize and use 
assessments collected by Institutional Investor as an alternative measure of creditworthiness. 
These are based on surveys among investors and analysts at banks, money management and 
securities companies, and should also not be affected by bond supply side shocks. We 
managed to collect data from 1987 onwards covering up to 181 countries (see Appendix C for 
details).  
Table 4 presents the regressions that use these four different measures as outcome variables. 
Panel A of the table replicates the OLS specification with controls (as in column 5 of Table 3) 
and Panel B replicates the baseline IV regression (as in column 6 of Table 3). In all four OLS 
specifications, the coefficients of interest are negative and statistically significant. The point 
estimates for Fitch is comparable to S&P, the ones for Moody’s and the non-US agencies are a 
bit more negative. For interpreting the regression results of Institutional Investor assessments 
note that these ratings range from 0 to 100 rather than from 0 to 21. When adjusting for these 
different scales, the magnitude of the coefficient in this regression (-2.57) is thus similar to the 
coefficients for rating agencies and lies between the results for S&P and Moody’s. As before, 
the conditional correlation between IMF programs and measures of sovereign 
creditworthiness is significantly negative. When turning to the IV approach, the estimates 
again turn positive and statistically insignificant. This result emerges in all four specifications. 
Hence, irrespective of how we measure sovereign creditworthiness, we observe the same 
pattern as before: The negative association between IMF programs and creditworthiness 
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disappears when applying an approach that is able to control for selection on unobservables. 
Contrary to widespread views in parts of the existing correlational literature and especially in 
policy circles, we find no evidence for a negative effect on creditworthiness or a “stigma” 
associated with IMF programs. 
Table 4 – Other Assessments of Creditworthiness 
 







 Panel A: OLS regressions with controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IMF program  -1.420 -0.890 -1.386 -3.547 
 [0.308] [0.284] [0.389] [0.832] 
 {0.000} {0.002} {0.000} {0.000} 
     
 Panel B: IV regressions without controls 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IMF program 1.539 0.494 0.320 0.063 
 [1.357] [1.256] [0.908] [4.182] 
 {0.257} {0.694} {0.724} {0.988} 
First stage diagnostics:     
K-P underid. LM 12.588 14.771 14.032 24.923 
K-P underid. p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
K-P weak id. F 31.067 26.761 38.026 40.899 
Observations 1210 1127 855 1912 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the country level are displayed in brackets, p-values in curly brackets. Appendix 
D lists a comprehensive list of all economic and political controls.  
 
In a series of additional tests, we further test the robustness of the baseline specification. First, 
we want to address potential concerns regarding any of the two constituent terms forming our 
interaction instrument and aim to enhance the plausibility of the exclusion restriction. Second, 
we test whether our findings are driven by certain time periods or particular countries. Third, 
we apply an alternative definition of our treatment variable. Fourth, we run placebo tests 
challenging our identifying assumption. We report the results of these analyses in Appendix 
F and describe them below. 
With regard to the first component of the instrumental variable, IMFprobability, we take as an 
alternative a time-invariant, country-specific measure instead of the cumulative, time-variant 
probability. This makes IMFprobability multicollinear with the year fixed effects. Taking all 
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observations in the sample period into account considers observations from periods t+1, t+2, 
… to compute the probability in t, and thus uses information from the future to explain the 
present (see Nunn and Qian 2014). Although we regard this as conceptually problematic, 
column 1 in Table 4 shows that the estimates are virtually unchanged by this modification. 
The interaction term in the first stage is of almost the exact same size, showing that the 
relationship we exploit for identification does not depend on how a country’s probability of 
participating in IMF programs is defined. The significance of the IV, the K-P F-statistic, and 
the second stage point estimate are also very similar, as compared to the baseline. 
Regarding the second component of the instrument, some readers might, as discussed above, 
question the exogeneity of the IMF’s liquidity ratio. Even though individual countries in 
general are unable to significantly influence the IMF’s liquidity, a few countries in the sample 
repaid extraordinarily large tranches of extraordinarily large IMF loans in some years. While 
the repayment schedule of Fund resources is usually developed years in advance, we still want 
to exclude the possibility that such events could lead to a correlation between the liquidity and 
country-year specific economic fundamentals unrelated to the presence of an IMF program. 
While this would only threaten the exclusion restriction if this relationship depended on the 
country’s level of IMFprobability we still want to be cautious and exclude the country-year 
observations that could significantly influence the IMF’s liquidity. Column 2 excludes the top 
five percent of country-year observations with the largest “repurchases” of IMF loans and 
column 3 excludes all observations from countries in which such relatively large repurchases 
have taken place. Neither of these regressions yields substantially different results, indicating 
that individual repurchases in general – including the extraordinarily large ones – do not 
threaten the exclusion restriction.24 
Even if we accept the IMF’s liquidity as being plausibly exogenous, the exclusion restriction 
would be violated if other global trends correlate with it and also affect countries’ 
creditworthiness with different past probabilities of receiving a program in a heterogeneous 
way. We consider such a relationship unlikely in particular because we find no time trends in 
credit ratings across countries with different levels of IMF probabilities that are correlated with 
the IMF’s liquidity.25 There is also no evidence of a correlation between relevant global trends 
                                                                                             
24 Using only the amount of the IMF’s liquid resources (and thus only the numerator of the liquidity ratio) as the 
second component of the IV instrument also yields a very similar result. 
25 See the above discussion in section 3.4 and Figure 4. 
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such as global growth rates or the number of crises and the IMF liquidity ratio. To still examine 
this potential threat further, we interact global GDP growth and the number of banking crises 
with the country-specific probability and include these terms as control variables in column 4. 
The fact that neither the relevance of the IV in the first stage nor the F-statistics are affected, 
provides support for our approach. The result that the point estimate in the second stage 
barely changes further indicates that violations of the exclusion restriction are unlikely. 
In regards to the concern that atypical countries or periods could drive the results, column 5 
omits the years following the global financial crisis (GFC) and column 6 excludes all countries 
that were members of the Eurozone in year t. Arguably, the IMF programs that were 
implemented in Eurozone countries in the aftermath of the GFC were atypical. First, the IMF 
designed them jointly with European Union (EU) institutions. Second, default risks in 
Eurozone countries are potentially assessed differently than in other countries because signals 
from EU institutions and other EU member states will be taken into account. As columns 5 
and 6 show, these restrictions to our sample do not significantly affect our results. The 
coefficient on IMFprogram is again positive and statistically insignificant. In addition to that, 
the partial-leverage plots of the first stage, the second stage and the reduced-form regression 
(Figures 8-10 in Appendix F) do not suggest that outliers, or individual countries or years drive 
the results (see Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. 2018). 
Next, we redefine our treatment variable and use the binary variable IMFapproval as an 
alternative in column 7. This variable indicates only the year in which an agreement with the 
IMF was reached and is set to zero for all other years, including the years during which an 
IMF program was still in place. Again, we observe a significantly negative OLS coefficient (not 
shown), which turns positive and insignificant when accounting for endogeneity via our IV 
strategy (column 7). This is important in two ways. First, it is reassuring that our IV approach 
also works for the approval of programs. Second, this allows us to compare the IV-based 
country-year level results more directly with the following results. These are based on an 
alternative dataset and an alternative identification strategy (subsequent section).  
Last, we run simulations with 1000 repetitions where we randomly assign either (i) the 
liquidity across years or (ii) the probability across countries in the first stage as placebo tests, 
as suggested by Christian and Barrett (2017). The coefficients that these placebo tests yield are 
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close to normally distributed around zero, further supporting that our specification does not 
pick up any spurious trends (see Figures 11 and 12 in Appendix F).  
5 Conclusion 
As the international lender of last resort, the IMF’s main objective is to help countries resolve 
their balance-of-payments problems. Its loan programs need to restore the creditworthiness of 
countries with severely limited access to external financial resources. In light of the IMF’s 
resurgence as the most important multilateral actor in the global financial system, this study 
re-investigates the IMF’s effectiveness in achieving this key goal with new data and new 
identification strategies.  
As we show, the fear that IMF programs carry a negative stigma can be explained by the 
endogenous selection of countries with already deteriorating economic conditions into 
programs. Our results paint an alternative, more nuanced, picture. The presence of the IMF 
does not generally affect the creditworthiness of the program country in a negative way. 
Although adjustments under IMF programs are often contractionary, the positive signal that 
the program conveys prevents creditworthiness assessments from deteriorating. IMF 
programs, thus, provide a cushion that allows program countries a transition period in which 
they can implement potentially contractionary reforms without having to fear further rating 
downgrades. 
Our results remain silent about the long-term benefits of reforms under IMF programs. First, 
the successful implementation of reforms that provide a sustainable solution to the country’s 
underlying problems comes with many obstacles along the way. The fact that the IMF’s 
engagement sends a positive signal to financial markets that provides countries with 
important time and maneuvering room to overcome crises. This, however, is only a 
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Appendix A: Construction of the Sovereign Ratings Database 
The description of how the sovereign rating database was constructed is in most parts identical 
to the part in the online appendix of Fuchs and Gehring (2017), but reprinted here for the 
reader’s convenience. Fuchs and Gehring also provide more details about the ratings and the 
individual agencies. 
Data on sovereign ratings assigned by CI, Dagong, DBRS, JCR, Moody’s, R&I, and S&P have 
been obtained from Bloomberg. Hence, everybody with access to Bloomberg can replicate the 
dataset easily. We downloaded the data in late September 2012 in the Princeton University 
Library and updated all information on June 28, 2013.26 
The approach was the following: 
(1) To access the data, we logged on to a Bloomberg terminal and typed “CSDR.” The variables 
selected are Foreign Long Term for CI, FC LT Sovereign Ratings for Dagong, Foreign Currency LT 
Debt for DBRS, JCR, Moody’s and S&P, and Foreign Curr Issuer Rtg for R&I. We followed 
Bloomberg and collected Moody’s foreign currency issuer rating if Moody’s had not assigned 
a foreign-currency debt rating to a country. We took screenshots for each page displaying 
sovereign ratings. 
(2) Using these screenshots, two student assistants entered the letter-ratings into a database. 
The double-coding was used to identify and correct typing errors. 
(3) The three-letter ratings were translated to numerical values according to the 21-point scale 
presented in Appendix B. 
(4) We checked the data for potential errors, for example by examining rating changes by more 
than two steps. Two obvious mistakes in the R&I data from Bloomberg have been corrected 
after e-mail correspondence with the agency’s chief analyst: (i) India received a “BBB+” rating 
on 15 June 1998, and a “BBB” rating on 18 November 1998, 20 December 1999, and 30 January 
2001, (ii) Ukraine received an “BB-” rating on 18 July 1998, a “B” rating on 28 August 1998, 
and a “B-” rating on 28 September 1999. 
  
                                                                                             
26 The ratings from Feri and Fitch have been obtained from the companies directly. 
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Appendix B: Translation of Sovereign Ratings into Numerical Values  
Table 5 – Translation of Sovereign Ratings into Numerical Values  




CHN CAN DEU 
USA 
(FRA) 
USA JPN JPN USA 
AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA Aaa AAA AAA AAA 21 
AA+ AA+ AAH AA+ AA+ Aa1 AA+ AA+ AA+ 20 
AA AA AA AA AA Aa2 AA AA AA 19 
AA- AA- AAL AA- AA- Aa3 AA- AA- AA- 18 
A+ A+ AH A+ A+ A1 A+ A+ A+ 17 
A A A A A A2 A A A 16 
A- A- AL A- A- A3 A- A- A- 15 
BBB+ BBB+ BBBH BBB+ BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ 14 
BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB Baa2 BBB BBB BBB 13 
BBB- BBB- BBBL BBB- BBB- Baa3 BBB- BBB- BBB- 12 
BB+ BB+ BBH BB+ BB+ Ba1 BB+ BB+ BB+ 11 
BB BB BB BB BB Ba2 BB BB BB 10 
BB- BB- BBL BB- BB- Ba3 BB- BB- BB- 9 
B+ B+ BH B+ B+ B1 B+ B+ B+ 8 
B B B B B B2 B B B 7 
B- B- BL B- B- B3 B- B- B- 6 
CCC+ CCC+ CCCH CCC+ CCC+ Caa1 CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ 5 
CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC Caa2 CCC CCC CCC 4 
CCC- CCC- CCCL CCC- CCC- Caa3 CCC- CCC- CCC- 3 
CC CC CC CC CC Ca CC CC CC 2 
C C C  C C C  C 1 
DDD    DDD  DDD  SD 1 
DD    DD  DD   1 
D D D D D  D D D 1 
    RD  RD   1 
Sources: Rating scales from company webpages, except DBRS and Feri. DBRS and Feri scales were 
obtained from the agencies via personal e-mail communication. 
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Appendix C: Institutional Investor Data 
We use data from Institutional Investor as an alternative assessment of a country’s 
creditworthiness. Regarding the methodology, the company states that “Institutional 
Investor’s Country Credit ratings are based on information provided by senior economists and 
sovereign-risk analysts at leading global banks and money management and securities firms. 
The respondents have graded each country on a scale of zero to 100, with 100 representing the 
least likelihood of default. We weighted participants' responses according to their institutions’ 
global exposure. Names of respondents are kept strictly confidential.” 
The access to the individual reports is easy for subscribers, or to those with access to a data 
provider like “EBSCOhost.” To access the data, a reader interested in replication or extending 
this study can go to http://www.institutionalinvestor.com, select “Research + Rankings” and 











For the newer years, the accessible files look like the following example. 
  
In each year, we use the country assessments as of September. Only in three years we had to 
revert to using the assessment as of March as the September value was not available. We then 
import the values into STATA, merge them with country codes and add them to the rest of 
our data. The ratings range is between 0 and 100, with 100 expressing the highest confidence 
on behalf of the experts. 
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Appendix D: Control Variables  
As discussed in the main text, we add an extensive set of control variables to some – but not 
the main – regressions. For this control vector, we build on and combine the sets of explanatory 
variables employed in Cantor and Packer (1996), Archer et al. (2007) and Hill et al. (2010) to 
control for the country-specific economic and political factors that should capture countries’ 
ability and willingness to repay their debts. 
We therefore add the following variables: the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, the annual 
GDP growth rate and its square, the inflation rate, the rents from natural resources (over GDP), 
the log of population, the debt to GDP ratio, the annual change in government debt (over 
GDP), trade (over GDP), the current account balance (over GDP), external debt (over GDP), 
the two variables indicating whether the country defaulted ever or within the previous five 
years, the quality of the rule of law, the degree of democracy (Polity IV), whether an election 
took place, the number of the government’s years in office, the ruling party’s political 
ideology, whether the country was affected by an internal or an external conflict, whether the 
military played an active role in politics, and an indicator for membership in the Eurozone 
(see also Fuchs and Gehring 2017). 
We also include variables that the literature identified as correlates of IMF programs. Some of 
them are part of the above list. The variables we include in addition are the occurrence of a 
systemic banking crisis, the exposure of foreign banks to the country, investment (over GDP), 
and the similarity of voting with the United States in the United Nations General Assembly 
(Copelovitch 2010; Moser and Sturm 2011; Sturm, Berger, and de Haan 2005). These variables 
are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), the IMF (Laeven and 
Valencia 2012), the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001), the Polity IV Project 
(Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2011), and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), the Bank 
for International Settlement (BIS), and Bailey et al. (2017). 
Descriptive statistics for all these control variables can be found below, in Appendix E. 
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Appendix E: Variables 
Table 6 – Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
Rating S&P 1350 13.58 4.99 1.00 21.00 
Rating Moody's 1142 14.13 4.98 1.00 21.00 
Rating Fitch 1077 14.15 4.98 1.00 21.00 
Rating Non-US 847 15.49 4.31 4.00 21.00 
Institutional Investor 1335 59.09 21.55 10.50 96.40 
IMF program 1350 0.21 0.40 0.00 1.00 
IMF agreement 1350 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 
IMF probability 1350 0.21 0.23 0.00 0.89 
GDP/capita (ln) 1349 8.80 1.37 5.69 11.38 
GDP growth 1350 3.89 3.75 -17.95 17.51 
Inflation 1349 0.06 0.07 -0.05 0.95 
Natural resource rents (% GDP) 1350 7.27 12.03 0.00 64.80 
Population (ln) 1350 16.62 1.61 12.96 21.02 
Debt (% GDP) 1349 48.45 30.41 0.00 238.03 
Change in Government Debt (% GDP) 1349 3.16 10.74 -115.42 102.29 
Default history (indicator) 1350 0.34 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Default in last 5 years (indicator) 1350 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 
Trade openness 1339 88.00 57.78 14.93 562.06 
Current Account Balance (% GDP) 1345 -0.26 8.25 -44.21 44.62 
External Debt (% GDP) 1349 21.90 28.31 0.00 189.48 
Law and Order 1350 4.14 1.29 1.00 6.00 
Democracy (Polity IV) 1348 6.16 5.57 -10.00 10.00 
Election 1350 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Honeymoon 1349 5.78 6.80 1.00 46.00 
Left government 1350 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Absence of Internal Conflict (ICRG) 1350 9.72 1.62 3.42 12.00 
Absence of External Conflict (ICRG) 1350 10.36 1.22 5.17 12.00 
Absence of military in politics 1350 4.45 1.44 0.00 6.00 
Euro area (indicator) 1350 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Investment (% GDP) 1347 24.01 6.37 8.27 58.15 
Systemic Banking Crisis 1261 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Foreign bank exposure 1350 217.92 625.79 0.008 6491.18 
UNGA voting 1350 0.20 0.91 -1.66 2.89 
Global GDP growth* 1350 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.08 
*Interacted with IMF Probability in the regressions. 
Note: Based on the sample used for specification 7 in Table 1.
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Appendix F: Results of Robustness Regressions Described in Section 4.3 





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
IMF program/ 
IMF agreement 
0.228 0.338 0.404 0.648 0.368 1.085 2.205 
[0.766] [0.844] [0.774] [0.834] [0.871] [0.907] [1.838] 
 {0.766} {0.689} {0.602} {0.437} {0.673} {0.232} {0.230} 
Country and Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2045 2004 1812 1767 1326 1840 1840 
K-P underid. (LM) 17.412 15.569 12.077 16.114 17.573 15.866 16.453 
K-P underid. (p) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
K-P weak id. (F) 36.810 36.301 32.441 40.727 34.260 36.002 36.379 
First stage        
IMF probability  3.604 3.933 3.358 3.947 3.415 0.534 
  [0.567] [0.681] [0.616] [0.645] [0.571] [0.295] 
  {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.070} 
IMF probability x 
IMF liquidity 
-0.513 -0.472 -0.514 -0.480 -0.466 -0.455 -0.224 
[0.085] [0.078] [0.090] [0.075] [0.080] [0.076] [0.037] 
 {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} 
Notes: The dependent variable is a country rating from S&P measured on a 21-point scale. Standard errors clustered at the country level are displayed in brackets, p-values in curly 
brackets. The sample contains up to 100 countries and covers the 1992 to 2013 period. GFC refers to the years 2009-2013. All regressions include country and year fixed effects, as 
well as the economic and political control variables in t-1.
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Figure 8 – Partial Leverage Plot: First Stage 
 
Figure 9 – Partial Leverage Plot: Second Stage 
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Note: Figures 8-10 are partial leverage plots (or “added variable plots”) of the first stage regression, the 
second stage regression, and the reduced form regression, respectively. They show that the first stage 
effect that we exploit for identification is not driven by outliers. Instead, the variable seems to pick up 
a general pattern, for which there are many “compliers.” Furthermore, neither the second stage, nor the 
reduced form seem to be plagued by individual influential observations. 
  
 49 
Figure 11 – Placebo Test 1 
 
 
Figure 12 – Placebo Test 2 
 
Note: These graphs plot the distribution of 1000 coefficients that result from 1000 first-stage placebo regressions. In 
these regressions we randomize the two constituent terms of the IV by a) attributing values of IMFliquidity to 
random years and b) values of IMFprobability to random countries. As can be seen, these coefficients are 
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Appendix G: Event-Based Identification 
Table 8 – Regression Results of the Event-based Identification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IMF start (t+11) -4.289*** -0.324* 0.021 0.019 
IMF start (t+10) -4.372*** -0.433** -0.014 -0.014 
IMF start (t+9) -4.335*** -0.457** 0.004 0.010 
IMF start (t+8) -4.338*** -0.449** -0.007 -0.006 
IMF start (t+7) -4.459*** -0.516** -0.055 -0.047 
IMF start (t+6) -4.516*** -0.528** -0.088 -0.079 
IMF start (t+5) -4.565*** -0.576*** -0.092 -0.078 
IMF start (t+4) -4.560*** -0.593*** -0.013 -0.001 
IMF start (t+3) -4.738*** -0.713*** -0.172* -0.166* 
IMF start (t+2) -4.839*** -0.745*** -0.236*** -0.216** 
IMF start (t+1) -5.003*** -0.883*** -0.392*** -0.369*** 
IMF start -5.023*** -0.933*** -0.470*** -0.447*** 
IMF start (t-1) -5.067*** -0.970*** -0.415*** -0.395*** 
IMF start (t-2) -5.102*** -1.023*** -0.275*** -0.268*** 
IMF start (t-3) -5.070*** -1.017*** -0.313*** -0.311*** 
IMF start (t-4) -4.927*** -0.987*** -0.322*** -0.322*** 
IMF start (t-5) -4.945*** -1.007*** -0.260*** -0.255*** 
IMF start (t-6) -4.916*** -1.000*** -0.277*** -0.264*** 
IMF start (t-7) -4.789*** -0.910*** -0.181*** -0.163** 
IMF start (t-8) -4.747*** -0.925*** -0.119 -0.099 
IMF start (t-9) -4.675*** -0.870*** -0.018 0.008 
IMF start (t-10) -4.686*** -0.915*** -0.042 -0.014 
IMF start (t-11) -4.664*** -0.892*** -0.027 -0.004 
Constant 14.084*** 
   
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year FE No No Yes Yes 
Month FE No No No Yes 
Observations 25625 25625 25574 25574 
Adjusted R-squared 0.077 0.917 0.995 0.995 
 
Notes: OLS-FE regressions. The dependent variable is the S&P rating at the end of month t; standard errors not 
shown. Figure 3.5 is based on the regression in column 4. Significance levels * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix H: Exploratory Analysis of Statements by Rating Agencies 
In a first step, we conduct an exploratory analysis about the availability of statements on 
Factiva, a commercial database for press articles as well as corporate and business information 
owned by Dow Jones & Company, and the LexisNexis search engine. We searched for articles 
containing statements of rating agencies concerning the up- or downgrading of sovereigns 
based on the (potential) interference of the IMF, using the following search terms 
independently or in combination with each other: IMF, Sovereign, Rating Agency, Rating, 
Development. The statements listed below contain decisions of the three major rating agencies 
Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch. Overall, the exploratory search process yielded 
statements for 14 different countries (in Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe) in the years between 
1999 and 2016. In the following, we list statements starting with decisions from Standard & 
Poor’s, the agency of primary interest, followed by the ones from Moody’s and those from 
Fitch. Countries are ordered alphabetically and ascending in years. 
Based on this exploratory analysis, which makes no claim of being exhaustive, we designed 




Standard and Poor’s: 
Albania, 2014 
“We revised the outlook to stable because we think that the recently concluded International 
Monetary Fund programme will serve as a policy anchor for fiscal consolidation and support the 
sustainability of Albania’s high government debt,” S&P’s said.” 




“Standard & Poor's (S&P) has raised Angola's sovereign risk rating to BB-, citing […] the IMF-
recommended fiscal and monetary reforms, which are expected to help mitigate the downside risks 
to over-dependence on the hydrocarbon sector.” 
Source: IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, accessed via Factiva, 08.06.2017 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2016 
“The IMF arrangement will also provide the fiscal space for needed reforms and infrastructure 
investments. […] it will anchor fiscal discipline for the authorities and aim to improve revenue 





“We think the new International Monetary Fund (IMF) program [….] will help in addressing fiscal 
and external imbalances […]” 





Sri Lanka, 2009 
“[…] (S&P) revised the outlook on its "B" long-term foreign currency rating for Sri Lanka to 
positive yesterday. The move reflects the country's improved external liquidity position owing 
to the new International Monetary Fund (IMF) standby loan agreement of US$2.6 billion. […]. 
The stringent macro-economic consolidation conditions attached to the programme should force the 
government to reduce its fiscal deficit […]. The central bank's commitment under the programme to a 
strict monetary policy including a reduction of advances to the government and a flexible exchange rate 
should also have a positive effect on Sri Lanka's medium-term sovereign risk.” 
Source: IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, accessed via Factiva, 08.06.2017 
 
Ukraine, 2015 
“We view the risk of another default in the next two to three years as diminished due to the 
Ukrainian authorities’ commitment to the reforms set out in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 







“Moody's Investors Service changed the outlook […] to positive from stable. The rating agency 
cited Indonesia's recent Paris Club memorandum of understanding and the country's improved 
relationships with other foreign creditors, including the IMF, as bettering the country's liquidity 
position in the coming two years. […] Going forward, upward movement in the ratings will 
depend on, among other things, continued political stability, progress in disposing of IBRA 
assets, fiscal performance, and the ability of the government to continue to meet the targets under its 
IMF program and maintain good relations with foreign creditors generally. Moody's said that 
the positive outlook reflects progress made so far, but that continued reforms were necessary to 
lift Indonesia's economic performance and improve investor confidence.” 
Source: Moody's Investor Service Press Release, accessed via Factiva, 08.06.2017 
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Pakistan, 2015  
“Credit rating agency Moody’s has changed the outlook on Pakistan's sovereign rating to 
Positive from Stable, affirming the rating itself at Caa1 […]. The decision to change the outlook 
was prompted by Pakistan's improving liquidity position, the government's continued efforts 
towards fiscal consolidation, and the steady progress with structural reforms under the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)'s programme. Pakistan's external liquidity position has improved 
substantially in the past 12 months […], supported by the narrowing current-account deficit, 
ongoing disbursements from the IMF, […]. Meanwhile, fiscal discipline has also improved, as 
budget deficit and the government domestic borrowing have been gradually reduced. On the 
structural reforms front, the agency pointed to the country's successful completion of a number of IMF 
structural benchmarks, including those on the fiscal and debt management front and energy sector 
reforms.” 
Source: IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, accessed via Factiva, 08.06.2017 
 
Egypt, 2016 
“Importantly, the rating agency views the staff-level agreement with the IMF which was 
announced on 11 August 2016 as credit-positive, because it will help alleviate some of Egypt's 
external liquidity pressures. Under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Egypt would gain access 
to about $12 billion of external funding through the IMF. The agreement is subject to approval 
by the IMF's Executive Board, which Moody's expects within 6-8 weeks. In Moody's view, the 
agreement reached with the IMF is also important because it will unlock external funding from 
other multilateral and bilateral sources, and support the implementation of fiscal and 
economic reforms. These include the long-delayed introduction of a value-added tax and 






“Moody's assigned Rwanda first-time local and foreign-currency issuer ratings of B2 last 
week, and gave the country a Stable outlook. […] In Moody's view, a Stable outlook for 
Rwanda’s sovereign credit is justified given access to USD204 million from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) under the country's 18-month Standard Credit Facility (SCF) arrangement. 
Additionally, it sees the government's policy implementation track record as strong, and 
expects improvements in both its fiscal and external positions to materialise over the medium term.” 
Source: IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, accessed via Factiva, 08.06.2017 
 
Sri Lanka, 2016 
“Therefore, in Moody's view, while the IMF program will alleviate Sri Lanka's external liquidity 
pressures, a more durable improvement in the macro-economic and balance of payments 
pressures will depend on the extent to which authorities can durably reverse the ongoing fiscal 
deterioration while improving Sri Lanka's international competitiveness and attractiveness to 
foreign investors. The study underpins Moody's view that effective policy implementation 





“The decision to upgrade the sovereign rating of Ukraine's government to Caa3 is based on 
the following key drivers: […] 2. Progress in political and economic reform under the auspices of the 
IMF-led programme, supporting a rebalancing of the economy and a meaningful reduction in public 







“Fitch stated that successive IMF reform programmes have led to macro-economic stabilisation, 
including a reduction in the budget deficit and a stabilisation of the government's debt burden through 
tight fiscal policies.” 
Source: World Markets Research Centre Daily Analysis, accessed via Factiva, 08.06.2017 
 
Ghana, 2005 
“Fitch Ratings has upgraded Ghana's long-term foreign and local currency rating […] The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank supported Poverty Reduction Strategy will be 
supported with higher aid funding, which should improve public investment, counteract a 
projected current-account deterioration and improve international reserves.” 
Source: World Markets Research Centre Daily Analysis, accessed via Factiva, 08.06.2017 
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Appendix I: Systematic Analysis of Statements by Rating Agencies 
Based on the exploratory analysis, we selected FACTIVA as the more suitable database for a systematic 
analysis. In particular the feature to select an industry class improved the matching rate between search 
terms and statements significantly. Our final systematic approach was to 
1.) Open the database and login (library access or account is required). 
2.) Issue search queries:  
 “program” within three words distance to “IMF or International Monetary Fund”, Industry: 
Rating Agency, Language: English or German 
 “liquidity” within three words distance to “IMF or International Monetary Fund”, Industry: 
Rating Agency, Language: English or German 
 “reform” within three words distance to “IMF or International Monetary Fund”, Industry: 
Rating Agency, Language: English or German 
 “program,” “IMF or International Monetary Fund” and “rating” within a ten word corridor, 
Industry: All, Language: English or German 
3.) Manually skim over all statements and delete obviously false matches.  
4.) Pool all remaining text in one text file.  
5.) Relevant text is often embedded in larger bodies of text irrelevant to our purpose. Thus, we run 
a python script (see below) that searches the text for “IMF” or “International Monetary Fund” 
and extracts ten lines of text buffer prior and subsequent to a hit. Moreover, we used 
regularities in text structure to extract the according publisher and date. Selecting the size of 
the buffer one faces a trade-off between reducing the volume of text and cutting potentially 
relevant information. A ten line buffer is a conservative choice towards minimizing the loss of 
information.  
6.) Because these are still relatively large chunks of texts, we manually read the remaining texts 
and delete irrelevant relevant parts, and then copy the rest of the text and additional 
information (name of rating agency and country) to excel. If duplicates appear they are deleted. 
This left us with 126 statements. 
 
We then developed the following codebook. Two student assistants were equipped with this codebook 
and went through all statements. In case of deviations in opinion, we always choose the choice biasing 
against our priors, i.e. the effects we hypothesize. Accordingly, in case of deviating opinions statements 
are grouped as “liquidity and reforms” instead of “reforms only” and are grouped as 







Positive = 1 iff the statement in question includes remarks which indicate that the IMF is seen in a 
positive light by the rating agency. Assumes background knowledge about basic economic processes 
and implications of measures for economy. 
 Indicators for IMF being seen in positive light by rating agency:  
o Citing actual or possible implementation or continuation of an IMF program or measure or 
actual or possible positive developments due to an IMF program or measure as a reason for an 
actual or possible positive rating. Conversely, citing actual or possible lack of implementation 
or discontinuation of an IMF program or measure as a reason for an actual or possible negative 
rating. 
 Example for actual continuation of program as reason for actual positive rating: 
ID5: “The ratings firm cited the country's improved performance under the 
European Union-International Monetary Fund program, falling near-term liquidity 
risk and a better fiscal track record for its upgrade” 
 Example for possible discontinuation of/ compliance problems with program as 
reason for possible negative rating: ID10: “Greece's ratings could also be lowered 
for reasons unrelated to the proposed ESM, if the Greek government's ability to 
comply with the program is undermined by domestic political opposition or 
materially weakens for other reasons, increasing the likelihood of failure to fully 
comply with the IMF/EU program.” 
 Example for possible discontinuation of program as reason for actual negative 
rating: ID69: “The outlook is negative, reflecting what we view as ongoing social 
and political risks associated with deleveraging efforts by Portugal's highly indebted 
private and public sectors, as well as financing uncertainties related to Portugal's 
exit from the EU/IMF program, expected in May 2014. We believe this is 
symptomatic of diminishing political backing for further fiscal and structural 
reforms. The Constitutional Court's deliberations over further fiscal measures could 
coincide with Portugal's planned EU/IMF program exit in the second quarter of 
2014.”  
 Example for actual implementation of program as reason for possible positive 
rating: ID20: “Turkey's economy has been improving and a continuation of the 
current positive trend could lead to higher credit ratings for the country, according 
to the general manager of Moody's Interbank Credit Service's regional Middle East 
office. [...] "We see lower inflation, the fiscal deficit relatively under control and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) targets seem to be achievable," he said. The IMF 
is helping Turkey through a stabilization package that sets macroeconomic targets 
and provides aid in return. [...] In Turkey, programs have been suggested by the IMF 
that are aimed at lifting its economy out of the debt trap and making it into a debt 
paying machine. "The IMF provides financing to Turkey through a macro-economic 
stabilization program. The program calls for the government to take certain actions 
to correct the macro-economic imbalances. These imbalances include various fiscal 
and economic reforms that would lead to improvement in the macro-economic 
conditions.” 
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o Citing actual or possible implementation or continuation of an IMF program or measure as a 
factor for actual or possible positive economic developments in the country. Conversely, citing 
actual or possible lack of implementation or discontinuation of an IMF program or measure as a 
factor for actual or possible negative economic developments the country. 
 Example for actual implementation/ compliance with program as factor for actual 
positive developments: ID121: “As a result of the Chuan's cabinet's decisive policy 
to comply with the IMF program together with the disbursement of US$10.282 
billion as of March 30, 1998 out of the IMF rescue package for US$17.2 billion, the 
present market situation is relatively stable and the market confidence seems to be 
recovered to some extent. (…)" 
o Use of terms such as “successful completion” when talking about an IMF-program or measure. 
 Example: ID79: “Such political developments allowed to strengthen the fiscal 
management stability. The Latvian government also in late 2011 successfully 
completed the international assistance program with the European Commission and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), said the agency.” 
 
Negative = 1 iff the statement in question includes remarks which indicate that the IMF is seen in a 
negative light by the rating agency. Assumes background knowledge about basic economic processes 
and implications of measures for economy 
 Indicators for IMF being seen in negative light by rating agency: 
o Citing application for or implementation of IMF program or measures as a reason for an actual or 
possible downgrading 
 No examples 
o Citing application or implementation of IMF program or measures as a reason to keep outlook at 
negative 
 Example: ID74 “Moody's Investors Service has today confirmed Egypt's B2 
government bond ratings and maintained the rating outlook at negative. […] The 
key drivers of today's confirmation of Egypt's B2 sovereign rating and negative 
outlook are: [...]4) The formal request by the new Egyptian government for IMF 
support” 
 
Positive =0 and Negative =0 iff the statement in question neither includes remarks which indicate that the 
IMF is seen in a positive nor remarks which indicate that the IMF is seen in a negative light by the rating 
agency, or status of remark (positive/negative) is unclear. 
o Purely descriptive statements about IMF without evaluative content 
 Example: ID59 “Pakistan is also moving forward on structural reforms under its 
program with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These reforms focus 
primarily on fiscal consolidation, debt management, and addressing structural 
constraints in the energy sector.” 
o Statements with not enough context to conclude status (e.g. because it is unclear if rating has changed in 
any way) 
 Example ID93: ““However, policy adjustments and financial support under an 18-






Liquidity Only = 1 iff the only feature addressed by the rating agency in their remarks in connection with 
the IMF is the liquidity of the country that is being rated (regardless of whether IMF is seen as donor or 
whether there might be consequences for liquidity resulting from e.g. implementation of IMF-
program).27 
 Verbal indicators taken to address liquidity in statements about IMF: 
o “financial assistance” 
o  “program to relieve the financial burden” 
o “(future) disbursements” 
o “financial support from the IMF”, etc. 
 Example: ID8 “(…) In our view, such improvements could be brought about by a positive 
conclusion to the negotiations with Gazprom on Ukraine's gas contract and/or a 
resumption of disbursements under Ukraine's IMF program," the press release reads.” 
 
Reform Only = 1 iff the only feature addressed by the rating agency in their remarks in connection with 
the IMF are reforms for the country that is being rated (regardless of whether IMF is seen as the one 
demanding reforms or the source of further IMF-unrelated reforms)28. 
 Verbal indicators taken to address reform in statements about IMF: 
o “technical assistance” 
o “(…) bolstering its institutional framework” 
o “policy measures” 
o “IMF assisted economic reform program”, etc. 
 Example: ID3 “(…) Moody's report explains that the Solomon Islands successfully 
graduated from an IMF program in 2016, with progress in bolstering its institutional 
framework.” 
 
Reform and Liquidity = 1 iff the rating agency addresses both reforms and liquidity in their remarks in 
connection with the IMF (regardless of whether IMF is seen as the one demanding the reforms or the 
source of further IMF-unrelated reforms and regardless of whether IMF is seen as donor or whether 
there might be consequences for liquidity resulting from e.g. implementation of IMF-program). 
 Example: ID2 “(…) The new IMF credit facilities (an Extended Credit Facility and an 
Extended Fund Facility (ECF/EFF)) approved in November unleashed official lending 
that had been withheld for more than a year. The second driver for stabilizing the outlook 
relates to the adoption of key structural reforms both in connection with the IMF program 
and in technical consultation with the IMF and other multilateral lenders and donors. 
(…)” 
 
                                                                                             
27 If there are consequences resulting from IMF-related liquidity, then statement is coded as 1. However, if statement 
only addresses circumstances or conditions which led to IMF-measures with regard to liquidity, statement is coded 
as 0. 
28 If there are consequences resulting from IMF-related reforms, then statement is coded as 1. However, if statement 
only addresses circumstances or conditions which led to IMF-measures with regard to reform, statement is coded 
as 0. 
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Liquidity Only= 0, Reform Only = 0 and Reform and Liquidity = 0 iff either the rating agency neither 
addresses liquidity, nor reform nor both in their remarks about the IMF, or status of statement is unclear. 
o Use of the expressions “IMF program” or “IMF agreements” (or synonymous expressions) with no 
further specification with regard to what the program or agreement is about 
 Example: ID13 “(…) Under this scenario, the government can get the International 
Monetary Fund's program "back on track" and there is a strong prospect of positive 
ratings action, said Edward Parker, a senior Fitch analyst.” 
 
